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Paying the Price: Eliminating Life
Without Parole Sentences for
Juveniles in Rhode Island
Mackenzie McBurney*

“There is nothing more dangerous than a man without
hope.” – Craig Price1
INTRODUCTION

On a dark summer night, with the only light coming from a
sky of stars, a young man hopped a stockade fence and began the
calculated process of peering through windows and turning the
knobs on locked doors, searching for any way into a quiet
suburban house.2 Finally, he found an entry point—a wide open
kitchen window with a wire mesh screen that was easily slashed
open within moments.3 After climbing through the window and
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of
Law, 2019. Thank you, Professor Andrew Horwitz, for your support and
guidance. A special thank you to my family for their love and encouragement,
especially my brother, Joseph McBurney, who inspires me daily as an
example of what it means to be dedicated to the practice of law and justice.
1. Mark Arsenault, ‘Into Another World’ – Craig Price’s Story,
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 7, 2004, at A1. All information from articles written by
Mark Arsenault appeared in a three-day series published in the Providence
Journal. See id.; see also Mark Arsenault, ‘This Dark Deed’ – Craig Price’s
story, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A1; Mark Arsenault, ‘Flame of hope’ –
Craig Price’s story, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 9, 2004, at A1. Arsenault visited
with Craig Price in jail two times per month, from mid-2002 to 2004.
Arsenault, ‘Into Another World’, supra. Arsenault was not permitted to bring
a notepad or tape-recorder into the interviews, but Price and he exchanged
letters based on their conversations. Id.
2. See Arsenault, ‘This Dark Deed’, supra note 1.
3. See id.

553

554 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:553
onto the kitchen table, he began stealthily moving through the
house looking for his intended victim.4 However, what he came
across instead was the hand of an eight-year-old girl touching his
stomach while her eyes met his.5 As he tried to keep the girl from
screaming by clasping his hand over her mouth, he tripped,
allowing the child to let out a short high-pitched scream.6 At this
point, everything started to deteriorate. As the child’s mother
appeared, the intruder slammed her against the wall, whereupon
she desperately gasped for her children to call 911.7 Another
child, this one slightly older than the first, knelt beside her
mother, saying nothing as if she were in shock.8
Two days later, the bodies of Melissa, Jennifer, and Joan
Heaton were found inside their home.9 Melissa, eight years old,
was stabbed seven times.10 Jennifer, ten years old, was stabbed
sixty-two times.11 Joan, the mother, was stabbed eleven times.12
The killer had taken with him evidence of the murder weapons,
including the set of steak knives in a kitchen block Joan bought
hours earlier.13 This is not the story of a far removed tragedy that
one may only hear recounted late into the night while watching
crime show reruns. This is the story of a family from Warwick,
Rhode Island, whose gruesome murders on September 1, 1989, left
Rhode Islanders perpetually paranoid and fearful.14 This fear
was amplified when investigators linked the Heatons’ murderer to
the unsolved death of Rebecca Spencer, who had been brutally
murdered in her Warwick home two years earlier.15 As may be
4. See id. Price asserts that he was planning to kill Joan Heaton, but
had every intention of letting her two children live. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10.
See id.
11.
See id.
12.
See id.
13.
See id. A receipt reflected a purchase of a set of steak knives in a
knife block at the Christmas Tree Shop in Warwick, Rhode Island, at 7:24 PM
on September 1, 1989, by Joan Heaton, just hours before she and her
daughters were murdered. Id.
14.
See id. Before anyone was charged, two Warwick gun dealers
reported selling eleven firearms the week after the murders. See id.
15.
See id. On July 27, 1987, thirteen-year-old Craig Price killed
twenty-seven-year-old Rebecca Spencer, stabbing her fifty-eight times. Id.
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expected from a place where one can drive the length of the state
in just an hour, the people of Rhode Island have yet to heal from
this wound inflicted on them by the “official state demon”: fifteenyear-old Craig Price.16
At the time of Price’s conviction, the maximum sentence that
a juvenile offender could receive was detention at the Training
School until his or her twenty-first birthday.17 A swift and
reverberant public outcry spurred the Rhode Island General
Assembly to amend the state juvenile sentencing scheme to permit
juvenile offenders of any age to be waived into adult court and
thereupon be subject to adult sentencing, including being
sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).18 However, these postPrice changes predated a series of United States Supreme Court
cases recognizing that juveniles are constitutionally different from
adults, and thus, are not deserving of the harshest punishment.19
In its tripartite ruling on juvenile sentencing in Roper v.
Simmons,20 Graham v. Florida,21 and Miller v. Alabama,22 the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that it is a rare
instance where LWOP is appropriate for even the most egregious
offenses committed by a juvenile.23 The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed whether a categorical ban on LWOP for
juvenile offenders is constitutionally required, but given all that
the Court has said, it follows that the imposition of a LWOP
sentence for a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8, of the
16.
See id.
17.
See Arsenault, ‘Flame of hope,’ supra note 1. The Rhode Island
Training School is a detention facility “[f]or youth who have been adjudicated
as delinquent and those awaiting trial for serious offenses.” Juvenile
Correctional Services, R.I. DEP’T OF CHILD., YOUTH, AND FAMILIES,
http://www.dcyf.ri.gov/juvenile_corrections.php (last modified Apr. 3, 2015).
18.
See John J. Cloherty, III, The Serious Juvenile Offender in the Adult
Criminal System: The Jurisprudence of Rhode Island’s Waiver and
Certification Procedures, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 407, 407–08 (1992); see also
infra Part II.B.
19.
The “Craig Price Legislation” was passed by the General Assembly in
1990. See Cloherty, supra note 18, at 407–08 nn.5–6. The United States
Supreme Court rendered decisions considering the constitutionality of
juvenile sentences between the years of 2005 to 2012. See infra Part I.C.
20. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
21. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
22. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
23. See infra Part I.C.
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Rhode Island Constitution.24 LWOP for a juvenile offender
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence is
unconstitutionally disproportionate when viewed in the context of
the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders. As the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has declared, “it is the prerogative of the
General Assembly to define criminal offenses and set forth the
sentences for those crimes.”25 Accordingly, the General Assembly
should pass legislation categorically eliminating LWOP sentences
for juvenile offenders and giving all juvenile offenders a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation at a parole board hearing after fifteen
years served.26
This Comment contains three parts. Following this
Introduction, Part I explores the background of LWOP sentences
for juvenile offenders, beginning with the distinction between
mandatory and discretionary LWOP sentences, then moving to the
current state of juvenile sentencing law in Rhode Island. Part I
then shifts focus to three decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, which have recognized that juveniles are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Part I concludes
with a comparison of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Rhode Island and United States Constitutions. Part II argues
that Rhode Island can, and should, categorically ban LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders because LWOP for juveniles
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, makes limited
24. See supra Part II.A.
25. State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I. 2007).
26. See H. 5183, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); S. 0237A,
2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). During the 2017 legislative
session, the Senate passed the bill, twenty-eight in favor and eight against,
while the companion House bill was held for further study. Jacqueline
Tempera & Patrick Anderson, R.I. Senate passes bill ending life-withoutparole sentences for juveniles, PROVIDENCE J. (June 15, 2017, 5:59 PM),
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170615/ri-senate-passes-billending-life-without-parole-sentences-for-juveniles. The legislation was reintroduced during the 2018 session and assigned different bill numbers—
Senate Bill 2272 and House Bill 7596. See S.B. 2272, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2018); H.B. 7596, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018); see also Katherine
Gregg, R.I. bill would allow earlier parole for those sentenced for crimes
(March 27, 2018),
committed under age 18, PROVIDENCE J.
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180327/ri-bill-would-allow-earlierparole-for-those-sentenced-for-crimes-committed-under-age-18.
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contributions to the goals of punishment, and violates
proportionality. Part II then proposes that the appropriate cure
for the unconstitutionality of Rhode Island’s current sentencing
scheme is passage of legislation by the Rhode Island General
Assembly that categorically bans LWOP sentences for juvenile
offenders and provides for mandatory parole review hearings for
juvenile offenders after fifteen years served. Part II concludes by
showing that the arguments against passage of legislation
advanced by the Rhode Island Attorney General are unsound,
unwarranted, and fail to accurately recognize the unique
characteristics of youthfulness that render LWOP a cruel and
unusual punishment when imposed on a juvenile offender.
Finally, Part III concludes by challenging the Rhode Island
General Assembly to give every juvenile offender hope to one day
demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required for release
at a parole hearing by enacting passage of appropriate legislation.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Life Without Parole
The United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional.27
Mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes treat all offenders
identically and force the sentencing judge to prescribe this
sentence for every offender found guilty of a crime carrying the
punishment of LWOP.28 It is unconstitutional to use a mandatory
sentencing scheme when imposing LWOP on a juvenile offender
because “mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth
of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”29
The constitutionality of a discretionary LWOP sentence for a
juvenile homicide offender has never been addressed by the
United States Supreme Court, nor by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, leaving it a viable sentence to be imposed on juvenile
offenders. A discretionary sentencing scheme allows for the
sentencer to use his or her discretion with regard to how to
27. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; see infra Part I.C.3.
28. See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85,
90 (2015).
29. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476.
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sentence the offender, including, for a juvenile offender, taking
into account “an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics
and circumstances attendant to it.”30 These youth-specific
characteristics and circumstances include:
(1) the offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences”;
(2) “the family and home environment that surrounds
[the offender]—and from which he cannot usually
extricate
himself—no
matter
how
brutal
or
dysfunctional”;
(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including
the extent of [the offender’s] participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures may have
affected [them]”; and
(4) “that [the offender] might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, [their] inability to
deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a
plea agreement) or [their] incapacity to assist [their] own
attorneys.”31
However, as discussed below, a sentencer’s discretion to account
for these youth-specific characteristics and circumstances is not
enough to overcome the unconstitutionality of imposing a LWOP
sentence on any juvenile offender.
B. Current State of Juvenile Sentencing Law in Rhode Island
Under Rhode Island’s current statutory scheme, a juvenile
offender who has been charged with certain statutorily
enumerated crimes will be sentenced under one of two divergent
sentencing schemes—either lenient punishment as a child in
family court or standard sentencing as an adult in adult court
pursuant to a waiver from juvenile court to adult court.32 Absent
a waiver to adult court or a certification in Family Court, no
sentence or probation imposed upon a juvenile offender can last
30.
31.
32.

Id.; see also Chang et al., supra note 28, at 99.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78.
See id. at 488; 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 14-1-1 to -71 (2002).
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past his or her nineteenth birthday.33 As such, in order for the
standard adult sentencing scheme—which includes discretionary
LWOP34—to be imposed upon a juvenile offender, the crime
charged must be punishable by life imprisonment or constitute a
felony if committed by an adult.35 To effectuate the waiver
process, the Attorney General must move for a waiver hearing in
the family court, whereupon the court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) probable cause exists that
the offense charged has been committed and that the child
charged has committed it; and (2) that the child’s prior offenses,
history of treatment, or the heinous or premeditated nature of the
offense is such that the court finds that the interests of society or
the protection of the public necessitate the waiver of jurisdiction of
the court over the child.36
Once a juvenile offender has been waived into adult court, the
standard adult sentencing scheme applies. In Rhode Island, the
penalty for first-degree murder is life and the penalty for firstdegree murder plus an aggravating factor is discretionary
LWOP.37 If a defendant is sentenced to life in prison with the
33. 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-6 (2002). In 2007, the age limit in which no
sentence or probation imposed upon a juvenile offender could extend beyond
was changed from twenty-one to nineteen. Id. Certification in Family Court
occurs after a showing of certain required elements by the prosecution. Once
a defendant is certified, he or she is entitled to a jury trial on the charges;
this is the only situation when a defendant is afforded a jury trial in Family
Court. After being found guilty at the jury trial (or bench trial if the
defendant waived his or her right to a jury), an adult sentence can be
imposed upon the defendant. The defendant will serve up until his or her
nineteenth birthday at the training school, whereafter the balance of the
sentence can be suspended with probation, or the offender can be ordered to
serve the remainder of his or her sentence at the Adult Correctional
Institution. See Cloherty, supra note 18, at 428–29.
34. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002).
35. 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (2002).
36.
Id. §§ 14-1-7, -7.1. If the juvenile is charged with a crime that
constitutes a felony if committed by an adult and the juvenile is under
sixteen-years-old, the court must make minor additional findings to
effectuate the certification or waiver process. Id. § 14-1-7.2.
37.
These aggravating factors are:
(1) committed intentionally while engaged in the commission of
another capital offense or other felony for which life imprisonment
may be imposed; (2) committed in a manner creating a great risk of
death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device or
substance which would normally be hazardous to the life of more
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possibility of parole, a parole permit may be issued after a
minimum of fifteen to twenty-five years served, depending on the
year
and
the
crime
that
was
committed.38
than one person; (3) committed at the direction of another person in
return for money or any other thing of monetary value from that
person; (4) committed in a manner involving torture or an
aggravated battery to the victim; (5) committed against any member
of the judiciary, law enforcement officer, corrections employee,
assistant attorney general or special assistant attorney general, or
firefighter arising from the lawful performance of his or her official
duties; (6) committed by a person who at the time of the murder was
committed to confinement in the adult correctional institutions or
the state reformatory for women upon conviction of a felony; or (7)
committed during the course of the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of felony manufacture, sale, delivery or other
distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the
provisions of chapter 28 of title 21; shall be imprisoned for life and if
ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 that person
shall not be eligible for parole from imprisonment.
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002). Additionally, LWOP can be sentenced if
any person under the age of eighteen is kidnapped “by a person other than
his or her natural or adopted parent dies as a direct result of the
kidnapping.” 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2.1 (2002). If the prosecution, within
the proper time frame, recommends that LWOP be imposed,
the court shall, upon return of a verdict of guilty of murder in the
first degree by the jury, instruct the jury to determine whether it has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder committed
by the defendant involved one of the circumstances enumerated in §
11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 as the basis for imposition of a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole. If after deliberation the jury finds
that one or more of the enumerated circumstances was present, it
shall state in writing, signed by the foreperson of the jury, which
circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upon return of an affirmative verdict, the court shall conduct a
presentence hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the
attorney general and the defense to present additional evidence
relevant to a determination of the sentence to be imposed . . . . After
hearing evidence and argument relating to the presence or absence
of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall, in its
discretion, sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment
without parole or life imprisonment.
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19.2-1 (2002).
38.
See 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13 (2002). For example, a prisoner
sentenced to life imprisonment for first or second-degree murder committed
after July 10, 1989, but before June 30, 1995, must serve fifteen years before
the parole permit may be issued. A prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment
for the same crime committed after June 30, 1995, but before July 1, 2015,
must serve twenty years before the parole permit may be issued. In contrast,
a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment for first or second-degree murder
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Since there are no separate penalty provisions for juvenile
offenders who have been waived into adult court and there is no
minimum age for those who may be transferred to adult court for
a crime punishable by life imprisonment, a child of any age can be
subjected to the standard adult sentencing scheme, including life
in prison or LWOP.39
C. The United States Supreme Court Recognizes That Juveniles
are Constitutionally Different from Adults
In a series of cases from 2005 to 2012, the United States
Supreme Court developed a body of case law recognizing that
juveniles are constitutionally different from adults and, because of
these differences, certain punishments that are constitutional
when applied to adults are rendered unconstitutional when
applied to juveniles.40
1. Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders Under Eighteen Years
Old is Unconstitutional
The death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age of
eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.41 In Roper v. Simmons, the United
States Supreme Court relied upon three significant differences
between juveniles and adults that indicate juveniles cannot be
committed after July 1, 2015, must serve twenty-five years before the parole
permit may be issued. See id.
39. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002); 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13
(2002). While there are no categorical age limits imposed on when a juvenile
can be transferred to adult court, the juvenile must be competent to stand
trial. A person is considered to be “competent to stand trial if he or she is
able to understand the character and consequences of the proceedings against
him or her and is able properly to assist in his or her defense.” 40.1 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3 (2006).
40.
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
41.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. Decades earlier, in 1979, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court declared that the death penalty statute as written in
Rhode Island General Laws section 11-23-2 violated the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution because it amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. See State v. Cline, 397 A.2d 1309, 1311 (R.I. 1979); see also U.S.
CONST. amend VIII. In 1984, the Rhode Island General Assembly removed
the death penalty proviso from the statute, instead replacing it with life
imprisonment. See 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002).
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considered among the worst offenders, and these differences have
continued to be affirmed as crucial distinctions between juveniles
and adults in subsequent decisions.42
First, children have “[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which “often result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”43 This leads
to “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking” by
juveniles.44 Second, children “are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure” and they have “less control, or less experience with
control, over their own environment” resulting in an inability for
juveniles “to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.”45
Lastly, a juvenile offender’s character and personality traits are
not fully formed, making them less fixed, and less likely to be
“evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”46 In support of a
juvenile’s flexible character, the Roper Court relied on studies that
evidenced that most juveniles who engage in illegal activities do
not develop into chronic offenders with deep-rooted criminogenic
behaviors in adulthood.47
Taken together, these three differences between juvenile and
adult offenders highlight that juveniles have diminished
culpability when compared to adults and, as such, it is
unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender to the death
penalty.48
2. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Nonhomicide Offenders is
Unconstitutional
A LWOP sentence for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violates
the Eighth Amendment.49 In Graham, the Court described LWOP
42. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Graham, 560 U.S.
at 68.
43. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
44. Miller, 576 U.S. at 461.
45. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
46. Id. at 570.
47. See id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty
by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009,
1014 (2003)).
48. Id. at 573.
49. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
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as a forfeiture of the juvenile offender’s life that is irrevocable, and
to a juvenile it is tantamount to the death penalty itself.50 A
juvenile offender who is sentenced to LWOP will serve “more
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult
offender.”51 In reaching this decision, the Court affirmed that
“[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and
criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness
into account at all would be flawed.”52
Arguing in favor of the constitutionality of LWOP sentences
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the State of Florida attempted
to advance an argument that “[a]ge, as a characteristic of the
offender, is already deeply woven into the fabric of state criminal
justice systems.”53 However, the Court, while noting that Florida
had made efforts to create comprehensive rules governing a
juvenile offender’s treatment in the criminal justice system,
maintained that those rules remained insufficient on their own to
adequately address the constitutional rights of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders who were sentenced to LWOP.54
3. Mandatory Life Without Parole for Juvenile Homicide
Offenders is Unconstitutional
Following the Court’s decision in Graham, only juvenile
homicide offenders remained subject to LWOP
sentences;
however, the spectrum of sentences that can be imposed on a
juvenile has subsequently been further reduced, while remaining
consistent with the offender’s Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.55 The Court eliminated
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, stating there
must be some discretion to consider mitigating circumstances

50. See id. at 69–70.
51. Id. at 70.
52. Id. at 76.
53. Brief of Respondent at 50, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (No. 08-7412).
54. Graham, 560 U.S. at 76. Florida’s efforts included prosecutors being
required to charge sixteen/seventeen-year-old offenders as adults only for
certain serious felonies; prosecutors having discretion to charge those
offenders as adults for other felonies; and prosecutors not being permitted to
charge non-recidivist sixteen/seventeen-year-old offenders as adults for
misdemeanors. Id. at 75.
55. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
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when sentencing youthful offenders.56 These mitigating factors
include: (1) chronological age; (2) family and home environment;
(3) peer pressures; (4) inability to deal with police, prosecutors,
and assist defense attorneys; and (5) the greater potential for
rehabilitation.57 Taken together, a sentencing scheme that does
not account for these mitigating factors when imposing mandatory
LWOP renders such sentences disproportionate.58
Miller affirmed the bedrock principles that the Supreme
Court had been building on for years: that children are different
and that this difference indicates “a sentencing rule permissible
for adults may not be so for children.”59 In turn, the “imposition
of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot
proceed as though they were not children.”60 While the Court
explicitly declined to address whether the Eighth Amendment
requires a categorical ban on LWOP for juvenile offenders,61 the
Court opined that “given all [it has] said in Roper, Graham, and
[Miller] . . . about children’s diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change, . . . appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to th[e] harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon.”62
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Analysis Under the United
States and Rhode Island Constitutions is Identical
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
imposition of the death penalty, LWOP for nonhomicide offenders,
and mandatory LWOP sentences for homicide offenders violates a
juvenile offender’s constitutional right under the Eighth
Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.63
Therefore, an offender’s right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Rhode Island Constitution must meet at

56. See id. at 476.
57. See id. at 477–78.
58. See id. at 473.
59. See id. at 481.
60. Id. at 474.
61. See id. at 479. The Court determined that the mandatory LWOP for
juvenile homicide offenders was sufficient to decide the case. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 465; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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least this minimum standard.64
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has affirmed that the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution are interpreted
identically.65 Despite the fact that the Rhode Island Constitution
has the additional clause that “all punishments ought to be
proportionated to the offense,”66 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected the argument that this difference in
phrasing results in a divergent test from that set out by the
United States Supreme Court in accordance with the United
States Constitution.67 In determining that the
additional
language of the Rhode Island constitutional provision is already
inherently part of the Eighth Amendment, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has held that the two constitutional provisions are
identical.68
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that cruel and
unusual “punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1)
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.”69 Further, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court found that the application of this second
factor hinges on a narrow proportionality principle, and as such,
proportionality is determined by whether the sentence is “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime.70 Thus, “a constitutional violation
will be found only in extreme circumstances in which the sentence
is grossly disproportionate to the offenses for which defendant
stands convicted.”71
Factors to consider when determining whether a sentence is
unjustifiably harsh when compared with the crime charged are
the nature of the crime, the offender’s criminal history, the
64. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 8; State v. Monteiro,
924 A.2d 784, 795 (R.I. 2007).
66. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
67. See McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 469 (R.I. 2004).
68. Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 795; McKinney, 843 A.2d at 466.
69. McKinney, 843 A.2d at 467 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977)).
70. Id. at 469.
71. Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 795.
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legislature’s intent when it classified the crime, and the public
safety interest in incapacitating recidivists.72 If the sentence is
found incommensurate with the gravity of the crime, it is
rendered disproportionate and unconstitutional under both the
United States and Rhode Island Constitutions.73
This, however, should not be misunderstood as a
determination that Rhode Island is precluded from interpreting
cruel and unusual punishment differently from the federal
government.74 Rhode Island, without violating the Supremacy
Clause, “may grant its citizens broader protection than the
Federal Constitution requires by enacting appropriate legislation
or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution.”75 Therefore,
a punishment that has been deemed constitutional, or whose
constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment has not been
addressed, can be deemed cruel and unusual punishment under
Article 1, Section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution.76
II. ANALYSIS

A. Life Without Parole for Any Juvenile Offender is Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Rhode Island
Constitution
In Rhode Island, juvenile homicide offenders remain subject
to discretionary LWOP, but it remains an open question whether
this is permissible because the constitutionality of the sentence
has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court, nor
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. However, in Miller, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged its decision to leave
open the question of whether the Eighth Amendment requires a
categorical ban on LWOP for juvenile offenders, but “took pains to
make clear that all such [juvenile LWOP] sentences are now
suspect.”77
72. McKinney, 843 A.2d at 470.
73. Id.
74. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283
(Mass. 2013).
75. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008) (emphasis added).
76. See infra Part II.B.
77. Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of
Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 956 (2015).
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B. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Makes Limited
Contribution to the Goals of Punishment
One of the factors used to determine whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual is if it “makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”78
The acceptable goals of punishment traditionally include
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.79
When considering the goals of punishment in connection with a
juvenile offender, special attention must be paid to the fact that,
regardless of the severity of a crime committed by a juvenile
offender, the particular attributes of youthfulness diminish the
acceptable penological justification for imposing harsh
sentences.80
First, juvenile offenders have diminished culpability when
compared with adults, and retribution purposes are furthered only
when the sentence is “directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal offender.”81 As such, the blameworthiness of the
offender is related to determining whether the sentence is
warranted.82
Second, juvenile offenders are marked by characteristics of
“immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity,”83 and punishment
will only have a deterrent effect when the existence and severity
of the punishment creates a disincentive to breaking the law.84
The impulsivity of juveniles, combined with their irresponsibility
and recklessness, “make them less likely to consider potential
punishment” when committing a crime.85
Third, juvenile offenders being incorrigible is inherently
inconsistent with the characteristics of youth, and LWOP
78. McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 467 (R.I. 2004).
79. Sarah A. Kellogg, Just Grow Up Already: The Diminished
Culpability of Juvenile Gang Members After Miller v. Alabama, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 265, 276 (2014).
80. Miller v. Alabama, 576 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
81. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987).
82. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (internal citations omitted).
83. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010)).
84. Kellogg, supra note 79, at 293.
85. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72). These
characteristics render juvenile LWOP sentences to make limited contribution
to both specific and general deterrence goals. See id. at 472–73.
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punishment will only be justified by incapacitation if there is a
judgment that the offender is incorrigible—a habitual offender
who will always be a danger to society and who can only be
stopped through perpetual imprisonment.86 With juvenile
offenders, this determination is difficult—if not impossible—to
make since expert psychologists have problems “differentiat[ing]
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.”87
Lastly, juvenile offenders have a greater capacity for change
and limited moral culpability, making them amenable to
rehabilitation, while LWOP “forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.”88 The rejection of the goal of rehabilitation
reflects “‘an irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and
place in society,’ at odds with a child’s capacity for change.”89
1. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Violates
Proportionality
Central to the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and by proxy the identical provision of Article 1,
Section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution, is the concept of
proportionality—that a punishment must be proportional to the
offense in order to escape the constitutional prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment.90 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court has interpreted the proportionality requirement of the
Rhode Island Constitution the same as that of the United States
Constitution.91 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized “that the Eighth Amendment contains a narrow
proportionality principle such that a criminal sentence is excessive
and unconstitutional if . . . it ‘is grossly out of proportion to the

86. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73.
87. Id. at 73.
88. Id. at 74.
89. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
90. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59; see State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702, 706
(R.I. 1984).
91. McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 470 (R.I. 2004). As the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court have altered the proportionality doctrine,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has rejected the old tests and adopted the
new ones. Id.
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severity of the crime.’”92
The United States Supreme Court, through its rulings on
juvenile sentencing, has created a line of reasoning where juvenile
offenders are not as culpable or deserving of the harshest
punishments as adult offenders. The Graham Court found that
LWOP
for
nonhomicide
juvenile
offenders
violated
93
proportionality, and “it support[ed] this reasoning by stating
that juveniles are less culpable than adults. The Court’s
reasoning [did] not distinguish between the non-homicide and
homicide juvenile offender; thus, the abolishment of life without
parole should apply to both groups.”94 As such, LWOP for
juvenile homicide offenders violates proportionality because “a
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its
nature disproportionate to the offense.”95
C. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Can Eliminate LWOP for
Juvenile Offenders through Interpretation of Article 1, Section 8, of
the Rhode Island Constitution
Assuming, arguendo, that LWOP for juvenile offenders does
not violate the proportionality requirement of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has the authority to more strictly interpret Rhode
Island’s constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment than the United State Supreme Court has interpreted
the Eighth Amendment, providing more protections for juvenile
offenders than mandated by the Constitution.96 Both the United
States Supreme Court and scholars have recognized that
proportionality cases “exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what
factors may indicate gross disproportionality,”97 and that “[o]ne
92. State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 794 (R.I. 2007) (quoting McKinney,
843 A.2d at 467).
93. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
94. Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw
Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in
Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for A Second
Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 59 (2010).
95. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71; see supra Part II.A.1.
96. See Samuel Weiss, Note, Into the Breach: The Case for Robust
Noncapital Proportionality Review Under State Constitutions, 49 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 569, 569 (2014).
97. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
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would be hard pressed to identify any other area of constitutional
law plagued by such confusion at its very roots.”98 In light of this,
it seems unthinkable that the rights of juveniles to be free from
LWOP is left subject to a body of law that is unclear, confusing,
and lacks intelligible criteria. Accordingly, there is a compelling
reason for the Rhode Island Supreme Court to interpret Rhode
Island’s proportionality requirement more strictly from that of the
United States Supreme Court.99
1. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Has Previously Afforded
Greater Protections under the Rhode Island Constitution
As envisioned by Justice Brennan, a state court is permitted
to find greater protections of rights and liberties within the state
constitution, and by doing so, is in no way conflicting with federal
law, so long as the “case [is] plainly decided on independent and
adequate state grounds.”100 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed this when it found greater protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article 1, Section 6, of
the Rhode Island Constitution than the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constituiton.101 In Pimental, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was called upon to address the constitutionality of
sobriety checkpoints, of which “neither [it] nor the United States
Supreme Court ha[d] considered the constitutionality.”102
Recognizing
an
ability
to
hold
sobriety
checkpoints
unconstitutional despite an assumption “that the Fourth
Amendment would allow the . . . roadblock stops conducted,” the
Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that “greater protection may
be afforded to citizens under a state constitution even if the
federal and state language is similar. The Federal Constitution

98.
Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 477 (2005).
99.
See id. at 493. Because Rhode Island has a self-proclaimed parallel
proportionality requirement to that of the United States Constitution,
interpreting it differently than that of the United States Supreme Court
would seemingly lack legitimacy in the absence of compelling reasons. See id.
100.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions As Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 535, 551 (1986).
101.
See Pimental v. Dep’t of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1352 (R.I. 1989).
102. Id. at 1351.
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only establishes a minimum level of protection.”103
2. Massachusetts’s High Court Has Afforded Greater Protections
than the Eighth Amendment by Categorically Banning Life
Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Offenders
In 2013, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC)
held “that the discretionary imposition of a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole on juveniles who are under
the age of eighteen when they commit murder in the first degree
violates the prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment[]’ in
art. 26” of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.104 The SJC
examined “the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders that
render them ‘constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing,’” and concluded that all juveniles offenders “should be
afforded a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’”105 Effectively, this
decision “declar[ed] all LWOP sentences [for juvenile offenders]
unconstitutional under Massachusetts’s Article 26.”106
In line with the reasoning and decision of the SJC, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court is free to declare all LWOP sentences for
juvenile offenders unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 8, of
the Rhode Island Constitution. While the preferable route of the
elimination of juvenile LWOP sentences is enactment of
legislation by the Rhode Island General Assembly, if the
legislature refuses to codify what should be constitutionally
required, the Rhode Island Supreme Court can still protect the
rights and liberties of juveniles.107
103. Id. at 1350, 1351 (citations omitted).
104. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI; Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for
Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013) (alteration in original).
105. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 286–87 (first quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 471 (2012); and then quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75
(2010)).
106. Erin D. Knight, Note, Brought Back to Life: Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Resuscitates Parole Eligibility for Juveniles Convicted of FirstDegree Murder, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 155 (2016).
107. See id. at 159–60 (arguing that the SJC’s decision in Diatchenko
warrants the need for legislative action to remedy inconsistencies in the
sentencing scheme created by that decision, including, that “juveniles
convicted of second-degree murder, a lesser crime, may receive longer periods
for establishing parole eligibility than those convicted of first-degree
murder.”).
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D. Enactment of Legislation by the General Assembly is a
Codification of What Should Be Constitutionally Required to
Protect the Rights and Liberties of Juvenile Offenders
Through appropriate legislation, the General Assembly can
amend Title 13, Section 8-13, of the Rhode Island General Laws to
add additional language providing that “a prisoner sentenced as
an adult for any offense committed prior to the prisoner’s
eighteenth birthday, is eligible for a parole permit after the
prisoner has served fifteen (15) years of [his or her] sentence.”108
In short, anyone who is convicted of a crime prior to his or her
eighteenth birthday will be eligible for parole after fifteen years
served. This amendment has two important ramifications—the
elimination of LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, and
mandatory parole hearings after fifteen years served for juvenile
offenders who are sentenced as adults and face substantial
sentences, including multiple life sentences.
Scientific evidence confirms that juveniles are physically
different from adults, and these differences directly contribute to
the decreased blameworthiness of juvenile offenders.109 Because
juvenile offenders’ frontal lobes are not fully developed, they often
make decisions based on a “gut response,” rather than reasoning
through their actions and thinking ahead to the consequences.110
Juveniles are also plagued by hormonal and emotional changes,
including testosterone, which is closely associated with
aggression.111 Because a juvenile offender is still in the early
stages of the development process, which is reflected by the
particular characteristics of youth, fifteen years is an appropriate
length of time to guarantee a parole hearing. Fifteen years allows
juvenile offenders to mature past the deficiencies associated with
adolescence and demonstrate rehabilitation, while still requiring
the offenders to spend a substantial percentage of their lives
incarcerated. Additionally, juveniles “can generally be expected to
change more rapidly in the immediate post-offense years, and to a
108. H. 5183, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); S. 0237A, 2017
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017).
109.
See Brooke Wheelwright, Note, Instilling Hope: Suggested Legislative
Reform for Missouri Regarding Juvenile Sentencing Pursuant to Supreme
Court Decisions in Miller and Montgomery, 82 MO. L. REV. 267, 288 (2017).
110.
Id.
111.
Id.

2018]

JUVENILE PRISON SENTENCES

573

greater and absolute degree.”112 Thus, the amendment gives a
juvenile offender the opportunity to demonstrate those changes to
a parole board more immediately than the traditional sentencing
scheme would allow for.
E. The Rhode Island Attorney General’s Argument Against
Categorically Banning LWOP for Juvenile Offenders is Insufficient
to Protect the Rights of Juveniles and to Support an
Unconstitutional Sentencing Scheme
The current Rhode Island Attorney General (RIAG) is a
staunch opponent of enacting legislation that eliminates LWOP
for juveniles because it “will preclude the use of the LWOP
sentencing statute for the as-yet unknown juvenile criminal who
commits an unimaginably horrific crime.”113 The opposition by
the RIAG relies on the gruesome nature of a crime to support the
continued possibility of LWOP for a juvenile offender, which is
parallel to the argument advanced by the State of Alabama in
Miller.114 However, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
such an argument by pointing out that “none of what it said about
children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits
and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”115 In turn,
the distinctive traits and vulnerabilities of juveniles, which render
the imposition of LWOP a cruel and unusual punishment, are just
as relevant when an unimaginably horrific crime has been
committed.
The RIAG further opposes the legislation on the grounds that
there are already enough checks in place in the juvenile criminal

112.
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. h. (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
113.
Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin, R.I. Attorney Gen., to Dominick J.
Ruggerio, President, R.I. Senate (June 5, 2017) (on file with author). This
letter of opposition was written by the current RIAG, Peter Kilmartin, who
will be term limited in January 2019. Therefore, depending on the stance of
the newly elected RIAG, the opposition to reforming juvenile sentencing
legislation by categorically banning LWOP for juvenile offenders may or may
not be met with the same opposition from the newly elected Attorney
General’s office.
114.
Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition at 19–20, Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322572, at *19–20.
115.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.
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justice system.116 The RIAG posits that “Rhode Island has a
juvenile criminal justice system based on judicial discretion and
deference to the sensitive nature of juvenile punishment and
rehabilitation.”117 However, the judicial deference and sensitivity
he speaks of does not cure the unconstitutionality of imposing a
cruel and unusual punishment on juveniles because:
a case-by-case approach requiring that the particular
offender’s age be weighed against the seriousness of the
crime as part of a gross disproportionality inquiry would
not allow courts to distinguish with sufficient accuracy
the few juvenile offenders having sufficient psychological
maturity and depravity to merit a life without parole
sentence from the many that have the capacity for
change.118
Additional checks the RIAG cites are: (1) “a waiver hearing at the
Family Court as the result of which the Family Court deemed it
appropriate to have that juvenile offender tried as an adult”; (2) in
adult court “the juvenile would be tried and afforded the
protections of due process just like any other criminal offender”;
and (3) when sentencing the “Court would use all appropriate
factors, including the offender’s age and prospects for
rehabilitation, to determine the suitable sentence for the crimes
involved.”119 However, as will be further explained, all fall short
of curing the unconstitutionality of LWOP sentences for any
juvenile offender.
1.

A Waiver Hearing in Family Court Has Limited Utility

The first check the RIAG cites is “a waiver hearing at the
Family Court as the result of which the Family Court deemed it
appropriate to have that juvenile offender tried as an adult.”120
While this certainly does allow discretion for whether a transfer to
adult court is warranted, it has limited utility because, at such an
early pre-trial stage, the judge will have only partial information
116.
113.
117.
118.
119.
113.
120.

Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note
Id.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50–51 (2010).
Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note
Id.
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about the offender or the offense. Therefore, “[t]he key moment
for the exercise of discretion is the transfer—and . . . the judge
often does not know then what she will learn, about the offender
or the offense, over the course of the proceedings.”121 In turn,
with such limited information, if the waiver hearing judge does
transfer the juvenile to adult court, he or she is making the
decision to subject the juvenile offender to a sentencing scheme
that allows for the possibility of LWOP.122 While the United
States Supreme Court did note that discretionary, rather than
mandatory, sentencing in adult courts would provide the option
for a “judge or jury [to] choose, rather than a life-without-parole
sentence, a lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole or a
lengthy term of years,”123 the Court clearly did not consider this
an absolute cure to satisfy the Eighth Amendment problem of
LWOP for juvenile offenders, as it left open the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical ban on
LWOP for juvenile offenders.124
2. A Juvenile’s Inability to Assist in His or Her Defense Hinders
Due Process in Adult Court
The second check the RIAG cites is that, once a juvenile
offender has been waived into adult court, “the juvenile would be
tried and afforded the protections of due process just like any
other criminal offender.”125 Here, the RIAG’s argument is simply
ignoring the main tenet of the cases the United States Supreme
Court has decided regarding juvenile sentencing—that juveniles
are not like every other adult criminal offender, and just because
juveniles may be afforded the same protections does not mean that
121. Miller v. Alabama, 576 U.S. 460, 488 (2012). In juvenile court,
Miller was denied a request for his own mental health expert at the transfer
hearing, which was affirmed on appeal because, at that time, Miller was not
entitled to the services he would receive at trial. Id. However, the point the
Court was making was that since Alabama had a mandatory LWOP
sentencing scheme, even if an expert’s testimony would mitigate Miller’s
culpability, it would not matter because the mandatory LWOP sentence
would inevitably apply. Id.
122. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002).
123. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
124. Id. at 479.
125. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note
113.
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those protections work with the same effectiveness.126 In fact,
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings,” including
“[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel, seen as
part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects.”127 Juveniles
have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system, are
not well equipped to deal effectively with police or prosecutors,
and cannot effectively assist in their own defense.128 The same
logic that led the United States Supreme Court in Graham to
conclude that a categorical ban on LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile
offenders avoided “the risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a
court or jury will erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is
sufficiently culpable to deserve life without parole,”129 applies
with equal force for a categorical ban on LWOP for any juvenile
offender because the distinctive traits of juveniles are not crimespecific.130
3. Using Factors to Determine a Suitable Sentence Can Never
Account for all the Unique Characteristics of Juveniles
The third check the RIAG cites is that once the juvenile
offender is found guilty in adult court, the “Court would use all
appropriate factors, including the offender’s age and prospects for
rehabilitation, to determine a suitable sentence for the crimes
involved.”131 There are numerous factors the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that are relevant when analyzing
the culpability of a juvenile defendant, including chronological
age, family background, peer pressure, mental development, and
emotional development.132 In theory, if, after analyzing all of
these factors, the sentencing judge conclusively determines that
the juvenile offender shows an irretrievably depraved character, it
126. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010).
127. Id. at 78.
128. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477; Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
129. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78–79.
130. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.
131. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note
113. The “jury must also make specific findings beyond a reasonable doubt
before the court can even consider imposing an [sic] LWOP sentence.” Id.
132. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 116 (1982)).
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would then be appropriate to sentence the juvenile to LWOP.133
However, it is impossible for a sentencing judge to ever make such
a finding with reliability because “the brain of a juvenile is not
fully developed either structurally or functionally, by the age of
eighteen, [so] a judge cannot find with confidence that a particular
offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved.”134 The
one characteristic of youthful offenders that should conclusively
determine that LWOP sentences are never appropriate is a
juvenile’s great propensity for change, which makes rehabilitation
the appropriate sentence, not life incarceration.135
4. A Categorical Ban on LWOP for Juvenile Offenders Does Not
Undermine the Sentencing Process Because It Does Not Guarantee
Eventual Freedom
The final argument the RIAG advances against abolishing
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders is that it will “undermine
the sentencing process for victims and their
families.”136
However, as the SJC pointed out in its decision to categorically
ban LWOP for juvenile offenders in Massachusetts, a categorical
ban on LWOP for juvenile offenders “should not be construed to
suggest that individuals who are under the age of eighteen when
they commit murder in the first degree necessarily should be
placed on parole once they have served a statutorily designated
portion of their sentences.”137 Rather, once the juvenile offender
has served fifteen years, it will be in the purview of the state
parole board:
to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime, including the age of the
offender, together will all relevant information pertaining
to the offender’s character and actions during the
intervening years since conviction. By this process, a
juvenile homicide offender will be afforded a meaningful
133. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 284
(Mass. 2013).
134. Id.
135. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
136. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note
113.
137. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 286.
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opportunity to be considered for parole suitability.138
As advocated by the Senator who sponsored the bill in the Rhode
Island Senate, “[w]e are not opening the jailhouse doors. It does
not guarantee the release of any youth. It is possible that some
children will spend the rest of their lives in prison.”139 Victims
and their families will have the same opportunity to testify at the
mandated fifteen-year parole hearing, and the juvenile offender
will still have to demonstrate to the parole board all of the
qualities that would make any other prisoner eligible for parole.
This legislation is simply mandating that the parole opportunity
be available after fifteen years served.
CONCLUSION

To this day, Craig Price remains behind bars at a prison in
Florida—not for the murders he committed as a juvenile, since at
the time of his sentencing Rhode Island Law required him to be
released at twenty-one140—but rather due to a string of charges
levied against him while in prison, including contempt of court
and contraband in prison.141 Despite being one-thousand miles
away and locked up in Florida, Rhode Island continues to live in
the shadow of fear created by its “state demon.” As a result, seven
juvenile offenders are currently imprisoned in Rhode Island and
face lengthy sentences.142 Moreover, the constitutionally
138. Id. at 287.
139. Tempera, supra note 26. Senator Harold Metts represents District 6
of Providence, and introduced the legislation in the Rhode Island Senate.
140. See supra Introduction.
141. Tim White, Craig Price charged with attempted murder in Florida
prison stabbing,
WPRI
NEWS
(May
31,
2017,
9:48
PM),
http://wpri.com/2017/05/31/craig-price-charged-with-attempted-murder-inflorida-prison-stabbing/.
142. If this legislation took effect by the end of 2017, it would affect the
sentences of seven juvenile offenders: Russell Burrell, who is serving four
consecutive life sentences; Robert Winston, who is serving twenty-six years;
Jose Lopez, who is serving consecutive life sentences; Somesack
Phonepraseuth, who is serving forty years; Phearan Rot, who is serving life;
John Price, who is serving fifty years; and Edwin McGill, who is serving
thirty years. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra
note 113. Quandell Husband was also mentioned in Attorney General
Kilmartin’s letter of opposition, but Husband’s sentence was vacated and he
recently pled to twenty years to serve. See Katie Mulvaney, Life sentences
overturned, Providence man to serve 20 years for role in triple killing,
PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 29, 2017, 8:45 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/
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protected right of juvenile offenders to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment has been circumvented for fear of having to
face another gruesome juvenile killer and the desire to have the
option to keep that juvenile in prison for life.
In light of what is scientifically known about juveniles, which
the United States Supreme Court has recognized makes juveniles
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing, a
sentencing scheme that allows for LWOP for juveniles cannot be
constitutionally supported. Rhode Island must get out from under
the shadow of fear created decades ago and enact legislation that
will safeguard the rights and liberties of juvenile offenders.
Ensuring that juvenile offenders have a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release after a minimum of fifteen years served not only
preserves their constitutional rights, but also embodies the motto
that Rhode Island so proudly calls its own: “Hope.” Eliminating
LWOP sentencing for juveniles will give every juvenile offender
hope—hope that one day they will be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required to obtain
parole release.

news/20171229/life-sentences-overturned-providence-man-to-serve-20-yearsfor-role-in-triple-killing.

